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Abstract
Whereas adversarial training is employed as the main
defence strategy against specific adversarial samples, it has
limited generalization capability and incurs excessive time
complexity. In this paper, we propose an attack-agnostic
defence framework to enhance the intrinsic robustness of
neural networks, without jeopardizing the ability of gen-
eralizing clean samples. Our Feature Pyramid Decoder
(FPD) framework applies to all block-based convolutional
neural networks (CNNs). It implants denoising and image
restoration modules into a targeted CNN, and it also con-
straints the Lipschitz constant of the classification layer.
Moreover, we propose a two-phase strategy to train the
FPD-enhanced CNN, utilizing -neighbourhood noisy im-
ages with multi-task and self-supervised learning. Evalu-
ated against a variety of white-box and black-box attacks,
we demonstrate that FPD-enhanced CNNs gain sufficient
robustness against general adversarial samples on MNIST,
SVHN and CALTECH. In addition, if we further conduct ad-
versarial training, the FPD-enhanced CNNs perform better
than their non-enhanced versions.
1. Introduction
The ever-growing ability of deep learning has found nu-
merous applications mainly in image classification, object
detection, and natural language processing [12, 17, 28].
While deep learning has brought great convenience to our
lives, its weakness is also catching researchers’ attention.
Recently, researchers have started to pay more attention to
investigating the weakness of neural networks, especially
in its application to image classification. Since the seminal
work by [26, 21], many follow-up works have demonstrated
a great variety of methods in generating adversarial sam-
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ples: though easily distinguishable by human eyes, they are
often misclassified by neural networks. More specifically,
most convolutional layers are very sensitive to perturbations
brought by adversarial samples (e.g., [6, 31]), resulting in
misclassifications. These so-called adversarial attacks may
adopt either white-box or black-box approaches, depending
on the knowledge of the target network, and they mostly use
gradient-based methods [10, 18, 27] or score-based meth-
ods [4] to generate adversarial samples.
To thwart these attacks, many defence methods have
been proposed. Most of them use adversarial training to
increase the network robustness, e.g., [1, 14]. However, as
training often targets a specific attack, the resulting defense
method can hardly be generalized, as hinted in [27]. In or-
der to defend against various attacks, a large amount and
variety of adversarial samples are required to retrain the
classifier, leading to a high time-complexity. In the mean-
time, little attention has been given to the direct design of
robust frameworks in an attack-agnostic manner, except a
few touches on denoising [25, 29] and obfuscating gradi-
ents [11, 25] that aim to directly enhance a target network
in order to cope with any potential attacks.
To enhance the intrinsic robustness of neural networks,
we propose an attack-agnostic defence framework, applica-
ble to enhance all types of block-based CNNs. We aim to
thwart both white-box and black-box attacks without craft-
ing any specific adversarial attacks. Our Feature Pyramid
Decoder (FPD) framework implants a target CNN with both
denoising and image restoration modules to filter an input
image at multiple levels; it also deploys a Lipschitz Con-
stant Constraint at the classification layer to limit the output
variation in the face of attack perturbation. In order to train
an FPD-enhanced CNN, we propose a two-phase strategy;
it utilizes -neighbourhood noisy images to drive multi-task
and self-supervised learning.
As shown in Figure 1, FPD employs a front denoising
module, an image restoration module, a middle denoising
layer, and a back denoising module. Both front and back
denoising modules consist of the original CNN blocks inter-
leaved with inner denoising layers, and the inner denoising
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
02
55
2v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  6
 M
ay
 20
20
𝐿! LossImage Restoration 
Module
Middle
Denoise
Layer
Classification 
Layer
"𝑦𝑈𝑝𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝
𝑙𝑒Add 
Noise
Front Denoising Module (FPDFD) Back Denoising Module (FPDBD)
(FPDR)
(FPD)
Original
Implanted
Modified
(FPDLCC)
𝑥noisy
𝑥clean 𝑥clean𝑥!clean
Inner
Denoise
Layer
Residual
Block
𝑈𝑝𝑆𝑎𝑚
𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑈𝑝𝑆𝑎𝑚
𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝐴! 𝐴"𝐴# 𝐴! 𝐴"𝐴#
Figure 1: The structure of the block-based CNN, enhanced with the proposed framework named FPD: it consists of the
Lipschitz constant constrained classification layer FPDLCC; the front denoising module FPDFD, the image restoration
module FPDR, a middle denoising layer and the back denoising module FPDBD. -neighbourhood noisy samples xnosiy
and original samples xclean are used to train the FPD. Orange, blue and green blocks represent the original components of
the CNN, the proposed components that implanted to the CNN, the modified components of the CNN, respectively.
layers are empirically implanted only to the shallow blocks
of the CNN. Enabled by the image restoration module, the
whole enhanced CNN exhibits a multi-scale pyramid struc-
ture. The multi-task learning concentrates on improving
both the quality of the regenerate images x′clean and the per-
formance of final classification. Aided by the supervision
target xclean, the enhanced CNN could be trained to denoise
images and abstract the features from the denoised images.
In summary, we make the following major contributions:
• Through a series of exploration experiments, we pro-
pose a novel defence framework. Our FPD framework
aims to enhance the intrinsic robustness of all types of
block-based CNN.
• We propose a two-phase strategy for strategically
training the enhanced CNN, utilizing -neighbourhood
noisy images with both self-supervised and multi-task
learning.
• We validate our framework performance on both
MNIST, SVHN and CALTECH datasets in defending
against a variety of white-box and black-box attacks,
achieving promising results. Moreover, under adver-
sarial training, an enhanced CNN is much more robust
than the non-enhanced version.
Owing to unavoidable limitations of evaluating robust-
ness, we release our network in github‡ to invite researchers
to conduct extended evaluations.
2. Related Work
Adversarial attack and training White-box attacks are
typically constructed based on the gradients of the target
network such as Fast-Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) and Basic Iterative Method
(BIM) [10, 18, 16]. Some approaches focus on optimiz-
ing attack objective function like Carlini & Wagner attack
(C&W) and DeepFool [5, 20], while others utilize the de-
cision boundary to attack the network [2, 7]. Black-box at-
tacks mainly rely on transfer-attack. Attackers substitute
the target network with a network, trained with the same
dataset. Subsequently, white-box attacks are applied to the
substituted network for generating the adversarial samples.
Adversarial training, proposed by [10, 18, 27, 32], is an
approach to improve the robustness of the target network.
Normally, it augments the adversarial samples to the train-
ing set in the process of retraining phase. Adversarial train-
ing could achieve good results on defending against white-
box and black-box attacks. However, it requires to involve a
sufficient amount and variety of adversarial samples, lead-
ing to a high time-complexity.
Denoising Most denoising methods improve the intrinsic
robustness of the target network, contributed by obfuscat-
ing gradients: non-differentiable operations, gradient van-
ishing (exploding). Various non-differentiable operations
are proposed such as image quilting, total variance mini-
mization and quantization [8, 24, 11]. Pixel denoising ap-
proach utilizes gradient vanishing (exploding) to thwart the
attack, widely developed based on Generative-Adversarial-
Network (GAN) such as [19]. However, the aforementioned
approaches cannot thwart structure-replaced white-box at-
tacks easily [1]. Attackers could still conduct attacks by
approximating gradients of their non-differentiable compu-
tations. Instead of relying on obfuscating gradients, our
differentiable FPD can circumvent the structure-replaced
white-box attack.
Residual Block 
Residual Block 
Denoising 
Layer× ×
BottleNeck +
(a) inner denoising layer with bottleneck
Residual Block 
Residual Block 
Denoising 
Layer× ×
+
(b) inner denoising layer without bottleneck
Residual Block 
Denoising 
Layer
× ×
+
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
Image 
Restoration 
Network
(c) middle denoising layer without bottleneck
Figure 2: Three types of denoising layers which we have experimented on. (a) an inner denoising layer that linking two
residual blocks with bottleneck, (b) an inner denoising layer that linking two residual blocks without bottleneck and (c) a
middle denoising layer that denoising the input of the last part without bottleneck.
Our proposal is partially related to [29], as the denois-
ing layers in our FPD are inspired by their feature denois-
ing approach. Nevertheless, different from [29], the princi-
ple behind our FPD is to improve the intrinsic robustness,
regardless of conducting adversarial training or not. Con-
sequently, FPD includes not only two denoising modules,
but also image restoration module and the Lipschitz con-
stant constrained classification layer as well, establishing a
multi-task and self-supervised training environment. More-
over, we employ denoising layers in a much more effective
way: instead of implanting them to all blocks of the en-
hanced CNN, only shallow blocks are enhanced for main-
taining high-level abstract semantic information. We will
compare the performance between FPD-enhanced CNN and
the CNN enhanced by [29] in Section 4.1.
3. Feature Pyramid Decoder
In this section, we introduce each component of our
Feature Pyramid Decoder, shown in Figure 1. Firstly,
we introduce the structure of the front denoising module
FPDFD and back denoising module FPDBD. Next, the
structure of the image restoration module FPDR is de-
picted. Then, we modify the classification layer of the CNN
by applying Lipschitz constant constraint (FPDLCC). Fi-
nally, our two-phase training strategy is introduced, utiliz-
ing -neighbourhood noisy images with multi-task and self-
supervised learning.
3.1. Front and Back Denoising Module
A denoising module is a CNN implanted by certain in-
ner denoising layers. Specifically, a group of inner denois-
ing layers is only implanted into the shallow blocks of a
block-based CNN. Consequently, the shallow features are
processed to alleviate noise, whereas the deep features are
directly decoded, helping to keep the abstract semantic in-
formation. Meanwhile, we employ a residual connection
between denoised features and original features. In the light
of it, most of original features could be kept and it helps to
amend gradient update.
Moreover, we modify non-local means algorithm [3] by
replacing the Gaussian filtering operator with a dot prod-
uct operator. It could be regarded as a self-attention mech-
anism interpreting the relationship between pixels. Com-
pared with the Gaussian filtering operator, the dot prod-
uct operator helps improve the adversarial robustness [29].
Meanwhile, as the dot product operator does not involve
extra parameters, it contributes to relatively lower compu-
tational complexity. We explore two inner denoising struc-
tures shown in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. The correspond-
ing performance comparison is conducted in Section 4.1.
In our framework, the parameters of FPDFD and FPDBD
are shared for shrinking the network size. The motivation
of exploiting weight sharing mechanism has been explained
in [15]: weight sharing mechanism not only reduces Mem-
ory Access Cost (MAC) but also provides more gradient
updates to the reused layers from multiple parts of the net-
work, leading to more diverse feature representations and
helping FPD to generalize better.
3.2. Image Restoration Module
To build the restoration module, we firstly upsample
feature maps from each block of FPDFD (except the first
block) for the image dimension consistency and then the
upsampled feature maps are fused. Finally, a group of the
transposed convolutions transforms the fused feature maps
into an image that has the same resolution as the input. On
the other hand, we especially find that particular noise is
brought by the x′clean. To minimize its influence, another
middle denoising layer is applied to the x′clean, depicted in
Figure 2c. Contributed by the image restoration module
and the denoising module, it helps establish a two-phase
training strategy.
3.3. Lipschitz Constant Constrained Classification
The influence of employing Lipschitz constant on de-
fending against the adversarial samples have been analyzed
in [9, 13]. As stated in our following Theorem 1, the net-
work could be sensitive to some perturbations if Softmax
is directly used as the last layer’s activation function. How-
ever, no network has ever adopted another output-layer acti-
vation function before Softmax in defending against adver-
sarial samples so far.
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Figure 3: Implementation details of Lipschitz constant con-
strained (FPDLCC). It is implemented by involving a
squeezing activation function to the output of a fully con-
nected layer, i.e. Tanh.
Theorem 1 (the constraint on Lipschitz constant for fully–
connected network). Let NNFC be a K-way-L-layer-fully-
connected network, NNFC(x)k be the k-th component of
the network output given input x, wi be the weight matrix
of the i-th layer of the network, and bi be a bias matrix of
the same layer. Given a noise vector ξ, we can bound the
variation V component-wisely from above by:
Vk = |NNFC(x)k −NNFC(x+ ξ)k| ≤ e
θk|x(eη − e−η)∑
p e
θp|x+ξ ,
where θk|x is the k-th component of the input to Softmax
given input x. Given Softmax function as the activation func-
tion of the output layer, we denote the activation function
of earlier layers by f , f ’s Lipschitz constant by C, and let
η = maxk=1,··· ,K{[wLCL−1 |wL−1wL−2 . . . w1ξ|+bL]k}.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 1 to the sup-
plementary material. The theorem clearly shows that
wL and bL may have more prominent influence than
CL−1 |wL−1wL−2 . . . w1ξ| on the variation of the output
Vk, when we have 0 ≤ C
(
(L−1)
√|wL−1wL−2 . . . w1ξ|) ≤
1 achieved by using regularization to restrict the
weights getting close to zero. Therefore, we want to
restrict wL and bL by utilizing a squeezing function
fs with a small Lipschitz constant Cs before Softmax
in the output layer. Consequently, this reduces η to
maxk=1,...,K{CsCL−1[|wLwL−1wL−2 . . . w1ξ|]k}, poten-
tially leading to a smaller Vk. Therefore, the output of NNFC
could be more stable in the face of attack perturbation.
Algorithm 1 Detail Training Procedures
Input:
Clean images xclean, regenerate image x′clean, noisy im-
age xnoisy, label y, predict label yˆ, optimizer opt, up-
dated parameters θ, learning rate lr, weights decay wd,
seed s, other hyperparameters α1, α2, , the enhanced
CNN FPD (including the image restoration module
FPDR, the front denoising module FPDFD, the back
denoising module FPDBD and the modified classifi-
cation layer FPDLCC), loss functions L2 and cross-
entropy CE, random sampler RS, threshold T , epoch
N
Output:
FPD
1: Normalize each pixel of xclean into [0, 1]
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: noise := RS(s)
4: UPDATE s
5: CLIP noise BETWEEN [−, ]
6: xnoisy := xclean + noise
7: yˆ(1), x
′(1)
clean := FPD(xnoisy)
8: l2 := L2(xclean, x
′(1)
clean)
9: if l2 > T then
10: UPDATE PARAMETERS:
opt(θ = [FPDFD, FPDR], loss = α2 ∗ l2, lr, wd)
11: else
12: l1 := CE(y, yˆ(1))
13: UPDATE PARAMETERS:
opt(θ = [FPD], loss = α1 ∗ l1+α2 ∗ l2, lr, wd)
14: yˆ(2), x
′(2)
clean := FPD(x
′(1)
clean)
15: l2 := L2(xclean, x
′(2)
clean)
16: l1 := CE(y, yˆ(2))
17: UPDATE PARAMETERS:
opt(θ = [FPD], loss = α1 ∗ l1+α2 ∗ l2, lr, wd)
18: end if
19: end for
20: return FPD
To thwart various attacks, we let fs = Tanh(x) as our
squeezing function, shown in Figure 3. Moreover, we em-
pirically replace all the activation functions from ReLU to
ELU; this leads to a smoother classification boundary, thus
adapting to more complex distributions.
3.4. Training Strategy
We carefully devise our training strategy and involve uni-
formly sampled random noise to the clean images for fur-
ther improving the enhanced CNN. Let us define the en-
hanced CNN FPD, in which FPDR refers to the image
restoration module; FPDFD stands for the front denois-
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Figure 4: Implementation details of two-phase training strategy utilizing self-supervised and multi-task learning: the en-
hanced CNN FPD, in which FPDR refers to the image restoration module; FPDFD stands for the front denoising module;
FPDBD stands for the back denoising module; FPDLCC refers to the modified classification layer; xnoisy are the samples
in the -neighbourhood of each image. The first phase training is optimized by L2(xclean, x′clean) loss. If L2 loss > T , only
the parameters of FPDR and FPDFD is updated. Once the L2 loss reaches the T , the cross-entropy (CE) loss with L2 loss
jointly trains the enhanced CNN. Then, the second phase train the enhanced CNN further, jointly optimized by CE loss and
L2 loss.
ing module; FPDBD stands for the back denoising module;
FPDLCC refers to the modified classification layer.
To further improve the denoising and generaliza-
tion capability, we suppose that the samples in the -
neighbourhood of each image xclean constitute adversarial
samples candidate sets. We add uniformly sampled random
noise to the clean images by using a sampler. It is impos-
sible to use all samples in candidate sets, but the enhanced
CNN will have more stable performance on classifying im-
ages in a smaller δ-neighbourhood ([xclean − δ, xclean +
δ], 0 ≤ ‖δ‖∞ ≤  ) after training on noisy images. The
detail training procedures are described in Algorithm 1.
We propose the two-phase training to drive the self-
supervised and multi-task learning for jointly optimizing
the enhanced CNN. It helps the enhanced CNN to learn how
to denoise images and abstract features from them with low
cost and helps the enhanced CNN to learn a much more
accurate mapping between images and labels. As shown
in Figure 4, the first phase mainly focuses on regenerating
images, optimized by L2(xclean, x′clean) loss. To guarantee
the quality of x′clean used in the later training procedures,
we set a threshold T . If L2 loss > T , only the parameters
of FPDR and FPDFD is updated for generating the higher
quality x′clean. Once the L2 loss reaches the T , the cross-
entropy (CE) loss with L2 loss jointly trains the enhanced
CNN. Then, the second phase focus on using the good qual-
ity x′clean to train the enhanced CNN further, jointly opti-
mized by CE loss and L2 loss.
4. Experiments
In this section, we firstly investigate the best framework
structure through the exploration study. Moreover, we com-
pare with the most related work [29] as well. In the compar-
ison experiments, we focus on comparing the robustness be-
tween the enhanced CNN and the original one, conducting
adversarial training and normal training, respectively. Ow-
ing to the unavoidable limitations of evaluating robustness,
we apply various attacks to evaluate our performance. How-
ever, we cannot avoid that more effective attacks exist and
the trained network will be released for future evaluation.
We employ MNIST, the Street View House Numbers
(SVHN), CALTECH-101 and CALTECH-256 datasets in
the following experiments. MNIST consists of a training set
of 60,000 samples and a testing dataset of 10,000 samples.
SVHN is a real-world colored digits image dataset. We
use one of its format which includes 73,257 MNIST-like
32-by-32 images centered around a single character for
training and 10,000 images for testing. For both MNIST
and SVHN, we resize them to image size 64. Besides,
we repeat the channel three times on MNIST for network
consistency. For both CALTECH-101 and CALTECH-256,
we randomly choose 866 and 1,422 images as test images
Inner Denoising Layer Implanted Position Selection
Accuracy WhiteBox BlackBox Average
Shallow 1.67% 31.10% 16.39%
Deep 2.08% 27.02% 14.55%
Denoising Approaches
Average 11.04% 15.99% 13.51%
Flip 1.22% 17.34% 9.28%
Mid 0.32% 53.77% 27.05%
Mid + Inner 7.44% 42.41% 24.93%
Ablation Study
FFD 1.67% 31.10% 16.34%
FFD+R 7.44% 42.41% 24.93%
F 25.55% 62.72% 44.14%
Activation Functions Selection
ReLU 0.29% 49.28% 24.79%
ELU 0.28% 61.24% 30.76%
ELU + Tanh 0.25% 69.11% 34.68%
Bottleneck Selection
F2IB−Mid 22.21% 46.65% 34.43%
F2I−Mid 25.55% 62.72% 44.14%
No. Inner Denoising Layers Selection
F2IB 0.04% 13.26% 6.65%
F4IB 1.97% 15.90% 8.94%
Training Strategy Selection
FOne Phase 8.60% 51.08% 29.84%
FTwo Phase 25.55% 62.72% 44.14%
ResNet-101 Enhanced by [29]
X 5.72% 62.39% 32.56%
Table 1: Overall results of the exploration experiments with
ResNet-101 on MNIST.
resized into 224-by-224, respectively. We normalize image
pixel value into [0, 1]. ResNet-101, ResNet-50 [12] as well as
ResNeXt-50 [30] are enhanced in the following experiments.
We use Pytorch to implement the whole experiments.
4.1. Exploration Experiments
In this section, we conduct the exploration experiments
of the FPD-enhanced CNN which is based on ResNet-101
F on MNIST. In Table 1, we use L∞-PGD attack with pa-
rameters:  = 0.3, step = 40, step size = 0.01 for both white-
box and black-box attacks. Under the black-box condition,
we separately train a simple three layers fully-connected
network as the substitute network [23] for each network.
Inner Denoising Layers Implanted Positions Selection
We firstly explore the position to implant the inner denois-
ing layers. In Table 1, ’Shallow’ means that the denoising
layers are implanted into the first two residual blocks. Like-
wise, ’Deep’ means that the layers are implanted into the
third and fourth residual blocks. We observe that the ’Shal-
low’ outperforms ’Deep’ on average. It may be contributed
by the high-level abstract semantic information generated
from the directly decoded deep features. In the following
experiments, we always implant the inner denoising layers
to the shallower blocks.
Denoising Approaches Selection Next, we explore the
best denoising operation. In Table 1, no denoising layers are
implanted in both the front and back denoising modules in
’Average’, ’Flip’ and ’Mid’ denoising approaches. In these
three approaches, we only focus on cleaning the x′clean be-
fore passing to FBD. Specifically, ’Average’: x′clean and
xclean are averaged; ’Flip’: x′clean are flipped; ’Mid’: the
noise in x′clean are alleviated by the middle denoising layer
as depicted in Figure 2c. Finally, ’Mid + Inner’ means that
we implant the two inner denoising layers to both the front
and back denoising modules respectively. Meanwhile, the
middle denoising layer is also utilized. Distinctly, ’Mid
+ Inner’ is all-sided robust among them to defend against
both the black-box and white-box attacks, attributing to the
stronger denoising capability.
Ablation Study To validate the effectiveness of F , we
perform the ablation experiments on investigating the ef-
fectiveness of each module. As shown in Table 1, F per-
forms far better than both FFD+R and FFD in thwarting
both white-box and black-box attacks. This overall robust-
ness is owing to the increase of data diversity and the su-
pervision signal brought by F . Furthermore, FBD can fur-
ther clean the x′clean to enhance the robustness in defending
against the well-produced perturbations.
Activation Functions Selection We explore the activa-
tion functions selection. Table 1 indicates that ELU activa-
tion function outperforms ReLU. Furthermore, as shown in
Figure 3, ELU with Tanh achieves better performance than
ELU one with 3.92%. It demonstrates that ELU with Tanh
is the suggested activation function selection.
Inner Denoising Layers Selection We also investigate
the optimal number of the inner denoising layers and
whether to use the bottleneck in these inner layers. In Ta-
ble 1, FkIB−Mid: k inner denoising layers with the bottle-
neck as depicted in Figure 2a are implanted to each denoise
module FFD and FBD respectively. Meanwhile, the middle
denoising layer is used as depicted above; FkIB is similar to
FkIB−Mid except that no middle denoising layer is involved
in the framework. FkI−Mid means that the bottleneck is
not used in the inner denoising layers as depicted in Fig-
ure 2b. We observe that the bottleneck reduces the perfor-
mance around 10%. Moreover, although F4IB outperforms
F2IB, the enhancement is not worthy if we consider the
time complexity brought by the additional denoising lay-
ers. Therefore, we use F2I−Mid as our proposed framework
in the following experiments.
Training Strategy Selection We further demonstrate the
efficacy of our two-phase training strategy FTwo Phase as
depicts in Figure 4. We mainly compare FTwo Phase
with one-phase training strategy FOne Phase .i.e the first
L∞( = 0.3) L2( = 1.5) L2
Network Name FGSM PGD C&W FGSM PGD C&W DeepFool AverageAcc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m) Acc T(m)
O 4% 0.85 0% 46.42 0% 56.75 94% 0.95 82% 53.25 15% 1183.67 6% 364.13 27.57% 243.72
OFGSM 43% 0.95 0% 66.43 36.63% 39.57 100% 0.95 80% 64.22 74% 1177.27 6% 365.17 48.52% 244.94
OPGD 92% 1.85 76% 68.37 89.88% 42.92 98% 1.83 92% 68.32 93% 1193.5 9% 344.38 78.56% 245.88
F 31% 1.5 0% 72.3 88% 212 98% 1.73 95% 98.58 95% 1134.38 9.62% 911.9 59.51% 347.48
FFGSM 42% 0.95 0.87% 119 46.12% 181.6 97% 2.25 95% 113.97 97% 1047.83 33.16% 907.3 58.74% 338.99
FPGD 87% 1.6 64.03% 115.85 78% 160 100% 3.17 97% 108.5 100% 1043.25 11.87% 912.37 76.84% 334.96
Table 2: Robustness evaluation results (Accuracy %, Attack Time (min)) in thwarting the white-box attacks with ResNet-101
on MNIST.
training phase (describes in Section 3.4). Results show
that FTwo Phase could achieve higher performance than
FOne Phase with 14.3%.
Comparison with the Related Work As mentioned in
Section 2, the denoising approach proposed in [29] is sim-
ilar to our denoising layers in FPD. Therefore, we conduct
a comparison experiment with [29] as well. In Table 1, X
represents the enhanced CNN by [29]. We observe that our
F2I−Mid outperforms X . Especially, the performance of
thwarting the white-box attack is about 20% higher.
4.2. Comparison Experiments
We conduct a series of comparison experiments∗ to fur-
ther evaluate FPD-enhanced CNN performance on MNIST,
SVHN, CALTECH-101 and CALTECH-256.
Notation and Implementation Details Firstly, let us de-
fine the following notations for accurate description: F
represents the enhanced CNN; O is the original CNN;
FPGD and OPGD is adversarial trained by L∞-PGD (on
MNIST: =0.3, step=100 and step length=0.01; on SVHN:
=8/256.0, step=40 and step length=2/256.0); FFGSM and
OFGSM is adversarial trained by L∞-FGSM (on MNIST:
=0.3). All results are achieved with the batch size 100,
running on the RTX Titan.
On MNIST For sufficient evaluation, we firstly focus on
applying FPD to ResNet-101 on MNIST. We mainly con-
centrate on two performance metrics: classification accu-
racy and attack time. Longer attack time can be a result of
a monetary limit. In this perspective, we believe that longer
attacking time may result in the excess of time and mone-
tary limit. The attacker may surrender the attack. Therefore,
we state that attackers spend more time attacking networks,
which may protect the networks from another perspective.
We employ various white-box attacks to attack F , O,
FPGD,OPGD, FFGSM andOFGSM. We consider following
attacks, including L2-PGD, L2-FGSM, L∞-PGD and L∞-
FGSM. We set =1.5 and 0.3 to bound the permutations for
∗We use adversarial-robustness-toolbox [22], a tool for testing the net-
work’s robustness of defending against various attacks.
L2 and L∞ norm. Both L2-PGD and L∞-PGD are set to
attack for 100 iterations and each step length is 0.1.
We have the following remarks on our results as shown
in Table 2. Generally, F and its adversarial trained FFGSM
outperform O and OFGSM in accuracy around 32% and
10%, respectively. OPGD seems slightly more robust than
FPGD. However, as revealed by the average attack time,
more computational time (around 89 min) is spent on
attacking FPGD. In particular, the overall time spent on at-
tacking F , its adversarial trained networks FFGSM, FPGD
are longer than O, OFGSM and OPGD around 104 min,
94 min and 89 min. Above results have demonstrated that F
and its adversarial trained networks are harder to be attacked.
On SVHN We mainly assess the ability of FPD to en-
hance various block-based CNNs on colored samples:
ResNet-101, ResNet-50, ResNeXt-50. We employ a series
of white-box and black-box attacks to attack F , O, FPGD
and OPGD for each block-based CNNs. Initially, we eval-
uate FPD performance in thwarting black-box attacks. As
shown in Table 3, O and F of each block-based CNNs are
employed as substitutes. We adopt L∞-FGSM and L∞-
PGD to attack them. Besides, we observe that O is hard
to defend against a L∞-C&W attack, depicted in Table 4.
Therefore, we additionally adopt L∞-C&W to attack sub-
stituteO, to further evaluate FPD. As for white-box attacks,
we adopt following attacks: L∞-FGSM, L∞-PGD, L∞-
C&W, L2-DeepFool and L2-C&W. We set =8/256.0 for
above-mentioned attacks and PGD is set to attack for 40
iterations with step length 2/256.0.
We have the following remarks on our results as shown in
Table 3 and Table 4. Firstly, in defending against white-box
attacks, F and the adversarial trained FPGD far outperform
O and OPGD in accuracy for all the block-based CNNs,
especially in ResNet-101 and ResNeXt-50. We notice that
the performance of FPGD is not exactly satisfactory under
black-box attacks, yet the outcome is not very surprising.
As shown in Table 4, F-based networks achieve a high ac-
curacy under white-box attacks. Therefore, when these at-
tacks are applied to F substitute, some attacks effectively
fail, returning a large number of clean samples as adversar-
ial examples. Given that FPGD has a lower accuracy than
Network Name
Clean
Examples
BlackBox
ResNet-101 ResNet-50 ResNeXt-50
Substitute:O Substitute:F Substitute:O Substitute:F Substitute:O Substitute:F
FGSM PGD C&W FGSM PGD FGSM PGD C&W FGSM PGD FGSM PGD C&W FGSM PGD Average
Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc
ResNet-101 OPGD 89% 87% 87% 86% 80% 86% 86% 87% 86% 81% 88.01% 84% 84% 86% 92% 85.12% 85.68%FPGD 84% 82% 83% 84% 64% 78% 82% 83% 84% 76% 83% 80% 82% 84% 82% 82% 80.6%
ResNet-50 OPGD 85% 81% 83% 88% 78% 81% 80% 82% 88% 76% 80% 92% 92% 88% 92% 92% 84.87%FPGD 89% 87% 88% 89% 77% 87% 87% 88% 89% 62% 71% 86% 90% 88% 92% 92% 84.87%
ResNeXt-50 OPGD 96% 92% 93.48% 96% 86% 93.45% 92% 94.97% 96% 90% 92% 84% 86% 92% 92% 94% 91.59%FPGD 86% 80% 84% 86% 74% 82% 84% 84.81% 86% 80% 84% 66% 62% 86% 80% 82% 80.05%
Average Acc 88.17% 84.83% 86.41% 88.17% 76.5% 84.58% 85.17% 86.63% 88.17% 77.5% 83% 82% 82.67% 87.33% 88.33% 87.85% 84.61%
Table 3: L∞ Metrics: Robustness evaluation results (Accuracy %) in thwarting the black-box attacks with ResNet-101,
ResNet-50 and ResNeXt-50 on SVHN.
Network Name
WhiteBox
L∞( = 8/256.0) L2
FGSM PGD C&W C&W DeepFool Average
Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc
ResNet-101
O 1% 0% 0% 0% 28% 5.8%
OPGD 57% 36% 39% 1% 3% 27.2%
F 44% 44% 71% 62.22% 53.25% 54.89%
FPGD 48% 47% 72.57% 77.7% 57% 60.45%
ResNet-50
O 4% 0% 0% 0% 34% 7.6%
OPGD 55% 26% 28% 0% 11% 24%
F 33% 30% 61% 52.03% 36.78% 42.56%
FPGD 39% 35% 70% 73.3% 45.38% 52.54%
ResNeXt-50
O 13% 0% 0% 0.4% 51.24% 12.93%
OPGD 58% 36% 46% 4.5% 24.27% 33.75%
F 80% 80% 86% 86% 83.17% 83.03%
FPGD 80% 78% 86% 84.15% 84% 82.43%
Table 4: Robustness evaluation results (Accuracy %) in
thwarting the white-box attacks with ResNet-101, ResNet-
50 and ResNeXt-50 on SVHN.
(a) Adversarial
images.
(b) Restoration
(Adv).
(c) Restoration
(Clean).
Figure 5: Adversarial images (a) vs. the output of image
restoration module from adversarial images (b) and clean
images (c). Images are reproduced from the data in Table 4
(enhanced ResNet-101 attacked by PGD).
OPGD on clean samples for ResNet-101 and ResNeXt-50
(as depicted in Table 3), F-based networks achieve this bi-
ased performance under black-box attacks.
We also show the output of image restoration module in
Figure 5. Adversarial images are well “denoised” by com-
paring Figure 5a with 5b. Figure 5b and 5c illustrate that
the module output generated by adversarial and clean im-
ages are quite similar. It guarantees that restoration mod-
ule could generate similar images from both adversarial and
clean images for FPDBD, leading to more robust perfor-
mance in defending against attacks.
On CALTECH-101 & CALTECH-256 We further
demonstrate the efficacy of FPD on ResNet-101 on high di-
mensional dataset CALTECH-101 and CALTECH-256, at-
tacked by L∞-PGD attack for 40 iterations. For this attack,
we set  to 8/256.0 and step length to 2/256.0. To be spe-
cific, on CALTECH-101, F achieves 61.78% under PGD
attack. It outperforms O around 34.64%. On CALTECH-
256, our ResNet-101 model F achieve 49.79% accuracy
against 0.00% of the original one O.
In summary, above results have demonstrated that
the FPD-enhanced CNN is much more robust than non-
enhanced versions on MNIST and high dimensional dataset
CALTECH-101 and CALTECH-256. On colored dataset
SVHN, the performance under black-box attacks is not ex-
actly satisfactory. However, considering the performance in
thwarting white-box attacks, FPD-enhanced CNN performs
far better than non-enhanced versions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel Feature Pyra-
mid Decoder (FPD) to enhance the intrinsic robustness of
the block-based CNN. Besides, we have devised a novel
two-phase training strategy. Through the exploration exper-
iments, we have investigated the best structure of our FPD.
Moreover, we go through a series of comparison experi-
ments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the FPD. Attack-
ing these models by a variety of white-box and black-box
attacks, we have shown that the proposed FPD can enhance
the robustness of the CNNs. We are planning to design a
more powerful decoder to improve desnoising capability.
Also, we will exploit a hard threshold to filter relatively bad
restored images, further improving classification accuracy.
Finally, we will transplant FPD to non-block CNN.
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